The object of objectivity
The commonly rejected interpretation of scientific objectivity as faithfulness to the properties of objects should be reconsidered. This ‘ontological’ interpretation of objectivity retains relevance as a motivating ideal, despite the concept taking on a plurality of forms in practice.
The necessary perspectivalism of science has led several philosophers to argue conceptualisations of objectivity that refer to the objects of the world (the targets of scientific study) are not operational. Instead, objectivity should be conceived as the absence of some facet of subjectivity. I will argue that these subject-sided accounts of objectivity can only tell part of the story. Conceiving objectivity as purely subject-sided makes it impossible to understand the normative force of the concept – which I will argue relies on claims about how subjects relate to their objects of study.
I will argue that claims to objectivity are developed contextually. Scientists make judgements about how their subjectivities, objects of study, and scientific products should relate. Objectivity is increased when these judgements are guided by the ideal of being faithful to the properties of objects. The contextual dependence of these judgements explains the apparent pluralism of objectivity. The motivation of being faithful to the properties of objects explains how the different notions of objectivity cohere together and grounds the normative implications of the term.